Michigan Law Review
Volume 78

Issue 4

1980

Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: Defining "Recipient"
and "Program or Part Thereof"
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, and the Legislation
Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: Defining "Recipient" and "Program or
Part Thereof", 78 MICH. L. REV. 608 (1980).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol78/iss4/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: Defining "Recipient" and "Program or Part Thereof"
[LJibertywithout learningis always inperil,andlearningwithout liberty is
always in vain.
John F Kennedy, May 18, 1963'

Federal aid to private colleges and universities threatens the

American ideal of independent private higher education. 2 A private
university's reliance on federal funds casts doubt on its indepen-

dence; restrictions on the use of such funds tend to confirm that
doubt. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 and title IX of the
Education Amendments of 19724 restrict the use of federal aid by
universities. How title VI and title IX restrictions are interpreted de-

termines, to a significant degree, how independent private universities can be.

Section 601 of title VI provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance. 5

Section 901 of title IX, in virtually identical language, forbids discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity
receiving federal assistance. 6 The ultimate sanction for violating title
VI or title IX is to cut off aid to the noncomplying "recipient," but
I. Remarks in Nashville at the 90th Anniversary Convocation of Vanderbilt University, 1963
KENi4EDY PUB. PAPERS 406, 407 (1964).
2. See generally THE UNIVERSITY AND THE STATE: WHAT ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT IN

HIGHER EDUCATION? (S. Hook, P. Kurtz & M. Todorovich ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as THE
UNIVERSITY AND THE STATE]. The federal government spends $15 billion annually on higher
education, or roughly $1500 for every college student in America. Finn, FederalPatronageof
the Universities.-.4 Rose by Many Other Names?, in THE UNIVERSITY AND THE STATE, supra,
at 7. Private colleges today draw one third of their revenue from direct or indirect federal aid.
See TIME, March 24, 1980, at 70. This enormous amount of aid understandably frightens
academics, for "[n]othing draws American academics to the barricades more readily than
threats of government interference with the internal affairs of a faculty, or attempts by public
officials to limit what a faculty might think or teach so as to conform to political standards of
orthodoxy." McGill, Government Regulation and-4cademic Freedom, in THE UNIVERSITY AND
THE STATE, supra, at 143. Extensive federal aid may render unrealistic the Supreme Court's
1819 decision that a private college should not be considered a public trust subject to government control. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601-605, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252-253 (July 2, 1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1976)).
4. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (June 23, 1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 and scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Title IX applies only to education programs, and hence is
considerably less comprehensive than title VI.
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any such cutoff is limited "to the particular program, or part thereof,
in which. . . noncompliance has been.., found."' 7 This parallel
language in title VI and title IX leaves two alarming uncertainties for
private university officials who seek both a large, balanced budget
and independence from government influence. First, when is a university a "recipient" subject to title VI and title IX restrictions? One
federal court has held that when students receive veterans' educational benefits, their school is a recipient.8 Another court agreed that
direct aid to students makes their alma mater a recipient, but refused
to permit a funds cutoff.9 Second, although title VI and title IX limit
cutoffs to "the program, or part thereof' in which discrimination occurs, they do not indicate what constitutes a program. May an entire
university be considered a single program? Or could a university's
medical school avoid cutoffs even though its law school discriminated? Although the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) presumes that funds for an entire university may be cut off if
any division discriminates, ' 0 that presumption is contradicted by the
legislative history and the reasoning of several courts.
This Note explores the meaning of "recipient" and "program or
part thereof' in title VI and title IX. Section I studies federal court
definitions of "recipient" and the legislative history of title VI; it concludes that only organizations that exercise discretion in disbursing
federal funds to students are "recipients." Section II explores the
"program or part thereof' language as applied to the university by
examining legislative history and recent discrimination cases. It argues that, since Congress sought to protect beneficiaries both from
discrimination and from overbroad cutoffs, courts and agenices
should draw the perimeters of a funds cutoff by balancing the effect
of each of these hazards on the students. The Note therefore concludes that both "recipient" and "program or part thereof' should be
defined in terms of the ultimate beneficiaries of federal aid - the
students.
I.

WHAT IS A "RECIPIENT"?

Only recipients of federal assistance need comply with the restrictions and regulations of title VI and title IX. Federal assistance
to education includes direct grants to universities, direct grants to
students (such as veterans' benefits), and a wide variety of loans and
loan guarantees." Courts and commentators disagree over which
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
8. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), affd mem., 529 F.2d 514

(4th Cir. 1975).
9. Grove City College v. Harris, No. 78-1293 (W.D. Pa. March 10, 1980).
10. See text at notes 64-67 infra.
11. In fiscal year 1976, the federal government spent $8.1 billion on programs assisting
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federal programs make private universities "recipients." This Section describes the views of district courts and then turns to the legislative history of title VI to identify the most sensible construction.
A.

CourtApproaches to 'Rec ient':" Bob Jones University and

Grove City College
In Bob Jones University v. Johnson,12 the federal district court of

South Carolina held that any university whose students receive federal scholarships is a "recipient" of federal funds and hence subject
to title VI.13 The Veterans Administration had cut off scholarship
money to a veteran attending Bob Jones University because the university systematically discriminated against blacks. The university
received no direct federal aid - the student had independently qualified for the scholarship, and all payments were made directly to
him. 4 Nevertheless, the district court ruled that Bob Jones University, by accepting the student's tuition, received federal financial
assistance within the meaning of title VI.
students (including Basic Educational Opportunity Grants, Guaranteed Loans, Social Security
Benefits, and Veterans' Benefits) and paid $4.4 billion directly to institutions of higher education. See Finn,supra note 2, at 12. Finn aptly describes the variety ofgovernmental programs:
[Federal] money. flows through so many channels, twists and turns so many times between
its source and its destinations, is so uneven in its impact, so cramped in the uses to which
it can be put, and requires of its recipients so much in return, that one hesitates to describe
Washington as a patron of the higher learning. Perhaps the only form of financing that
cannot be found among the more than four hundred separate federal legislative provisions bearing on higher education is unrestricted support for such learning.
Finn, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis in original).
12. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), affd men, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975),
13. 396 F. Supp. at 602-04. See also In re Hillsdale College and the State of Michigan,
Docket No. A-7, Initial Decision, August 23, 1978, described in [1978] COLL. & UNiv. REP.
(CCH) 18,577, in which an HEW administrative law judge ruled that the grants and loans
Hillsdale students receive constitute direct federal aid and thus make the school subject to
federal civil rights laws.
14. 38 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) states:
The Congress. . .hereby declares that the education program created by this chapter is
for the purpose of(I) enhancing and making more attractive service in the Armed Forces
of the United States, (2) extending the benefits of a higher education to qualified and
deserving young persons who might not otherwise be able to afford such an education, (3)
providing vocational readjustment and restoring lost educational opportunities to those
service men and women whose careers have been interrupted or impeded by reason of
active duty after January 31, 1955, and (4) aiding such persons in attaining the vocational
and educational status which they might normally have aspired to and obtained had they
not served their country.
The statute expresses no intent to aid the school; it seeks only to help the veteran. Related
provisions lend support to this conclusion. 38 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) mandates: "The Administrator shall.

.

..
pay to each eligible veteran who is pursuing a program of education under this

chapter an educational assistance allowance . . ." (emphasis added). Likewise, 38 U.S.C.
§ 1685 (1976), dealing with Veterans Work Study, states, "Veteran students.

. .

shall be paid

an additional educational assistance allowance. . ." (emphasis added). Finally, the Predischarge Educational Program, 38 U.S.C. 1696 (1976), requires: "The Administrator shall...
pay the educational assistance allowance . . . to an eligible person . . ." (emphasis added).
Thus, the funds cut off in Bob Jones were paid directly to the veteran, and the University had

no control over who received the funds.
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Judge Hemphill rested his conclusion on three grounds. First, he
pointed out that by subsidizing students with either loans or grants,
the federal government frees a portion of the school's loan or schol-5
arship funds for distribution to students not receiving federal aid.'
Second, he refused to distinguish between direct payments to the
university and indirect payments through the student, "since the
payments ultimately reach the same beneficiaries."' 6 Both of these
arguments assume that Congress intended "recipient" status to attach to any university that touches federal dollars, no matter what
path the dollars take from the government to the school. Finally,
Judge Hemphill claimed that the legislative history indicated that
"narrow readings of title VI coverage are inappropriate."' 17 Therefore, all three grounds of Bob Jones stand or fall with the legislative
history of title VI.
In Grove City College v. Harris,'8 Judge Simmons of the Western
District of Pennsylvania applied the Bob Jones definition of recipient, but reached a markedly different result. Like Bob Jones University, Grove City College received no direct federal aid. When the
college refused to complete an HEW form assuring compliance with
20
title IX,19 HEW threatened to cut off Guaranteed Student Loans
and Basic Educational Opportunity Grants that were made directly
to Grove City's students. Grove City prevailed upon Judge Simmons to enjoin the cutoff.
Although the grants were made directly to students, the court
ruled that Grove City was a recipient of federal assistance subject to
title IX restrictions: "Since funds are provided which the college
would otherwise- have to supply from its own resources, the total
funds available to the College to carry on. its education programs
and activities are increased."' 2' The court repeatedly cited Bob Jones
in support of its definition of recipient. Unlike the Bob Jones court,
however, Judge Simmons refused to allow a funds cutoff. He dis15. 396 F. Supp. at 602-03.
16. 396 F. Supp. at 603.

17. 396 F. Supp. at 604.
18. No. 78-1293 (W.D. Pa. March 10, 1980).
19. Grove City College refused to execute the form "on the basis of conscience and principle." The College insisted that it received no federal assistance and hence was not subject to
title IX. Grove City is coeducational, and no evidence of sex discrimination was presented by
HEW. Grove City College v. Harris, slip op. at 2.
20. Judge Simmons held that Guaranteed Student Loans are not assistance within the
meaning of title IX because "contracts of insurance or guaranty" are expressly exempted by
section 902. Although the government pays interest on the loan during the time the borrower
attends a school, Simmons ruled that the interest payments are not assistance since they are
paid directly to the lender and hence appear to be part of the exempted contract of guaranty
with the lender. See Grove City College v. Harris, slip op. at 28. Since Guaranteed Student
Loans were exempted from title IX, Grove City's status as a recipient hinged solely upon the
Basic Educational Opportunity Grant Program.
21. See Grove City College v. Harris, slip op. at 23.
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tinguished Grove City from Bob Jones by noting that actual discrimination had been shown in the earlier case, but no discrimination in

Grove City's student programs was even alleged. 22 Absent a showing of discrimination, Judge Simmons ruled, innocent students

merely because the College refused to fill out
should not be punished
23

an HEW form.
The Grove City court reached the right result for the wrong rea-

sons. By accepting the broad Bob Jones definition of recipient, it
had to find other, more troubling grounds to justify its decision not
to terminate federal assistance. Thus the court held that HEW cannot cut off funds without evidence of discrimination, and it cannot
use the threat of a cutoff to force colleges to complete the forms that
enable it to document discrimination. Under the Grove City rule,

colleges violating title IX may avoid a cutoff simply 24by withholding
the information necessary to establish the violation.

To find a more satisfying justification for Grove City's result, we
must step back and reevaluate Judge Simmons's premises. Grove
City relies heavily upon Bob Jones for its definition of recipient. Bob
Jones in turn rests upon interpretation of the legislative history of
title VI. A careful reexamination of that history reveals cracks in the
foundations of both decisions.
22. See Grove City College v. Harris, slip op. at 34.
23. Judge Simmons offered several other reasons for enjoining the grant cutoff. First, the
students were held to have a constitutional and statutory right to a hearing before their federal
financial assistance could be terminated. Second, the HEW form required assurance of compliance with regulations prohibiting sex discrimination in employment in educational programs. Judge Simmons ruled that these regulations unlawfully exceeded the statutory
authority of title IX, and hence HEW could not require Grove City to execute the form. See
Grove City College v. Harris, slip op. at 29, 30A.
24. Judge Simmons recognized this possibility:
A situation may arise where the BEOG program is in effect and the College refuses to
sign a revised and properly drafted Assurance of Compliance upon request of HEW, and
in an instance where there is no available proof of actual sex discrimination in student
programs at the College.
As to the hypothetical situation, this Court offers no opinion as to what other legal
sanctions, if any, are available to HEW for use against the College.
Grove City College v. Harris, slip op. at 36.
A recent district court decision illustrates the importance of compliance reports in identifying violations. A college charged with discrimination against Chicanos refused to complete
compliance reports for those programs not receiving federal assistance. The court ordered the
college to complete the reports, saying:
[Since the purpose of a Title VI investigation is to enable [the Office of Civil Rights]
to determine whether a recipient is in compliance with Title VI, to interpret the provisions
of Title VI as limiting the scope of OCR's investigative authority to investigation of the
federally assisted programs or activities would essentially preclude OCR from effectively
discovering and determining whether the defendants herein are in compliance with Title
VI and from protecting the beneficiaries of the federally assisted programs or activities
even if there was rampant discrimination elsewhere in the college and such discriminatory
practices were affecting the federally assisted programs or activities. The d/lstnction between the authority to investigate and thepower to terminate should not be lost.
United States v. El Camino Community College Dist., 454 F. Supp. 825, 831 (C.D. Cal, 1978)
(emphasis added).

Note
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The Legislative History of 'Recipient"

The enforcement provisions of title VI and title IX are identical,
and the legislative history of title IX indicates that Congress intended "recipient" to have the same meaning under both provisions.25 This Note therefore looks to the legislative history of title VI
to determine the correct definition.
A thorough study of the legislative history of title VI calls into
question the Bob Jones court's assertion that "narrow readings of
title VI coverage are inappropriate. ' 26 Judge Hemphill supported
this conclusion weakly, citing only a statement by President Kennedy in his original civil rights proposals to Congress in 1963, and a7

2
vague statement delivered in committee by Representative Celler.

Although Kennedy's statement and proposals together suggest an executive intent that title VI be construed broadly, 28 they do not indicate that the President intended the statute to have the expansive
reach given it in Bob Jones.29 Celler's statement, even assuming it
25. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) ("The drafters of Title
IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the
preceding eight years"); Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics.4re Outside HEWs Jurisdiction, 65 GEo. L.J. 49, 50 (1976).
26. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 604 (D.S.C. 1974).

27. 396 F. Supp. at 604.
28. The court quoted Kennedy as urging Congress to "pass a single comprehensive provision making it clear that the federal government is not required under any statute, to furnish
any kind of financial assistance. . . to any program or activity in which racial discrimination
occurs," 396 F. Supp. at 604 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1963)).
29. While President Kennedy signed executive orders aimed at preventing discriminatory
disposition of federal funds in- certain specific areas during the first half of his term in office,
see EXEC. ORDER No. 11063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63 Compilation); ExEC. ORDER No. 11114, 3
C.F.R. 774 (1959-63 Compilation), they were no more sweeping than similar orders previously
issued by President Roosevelt, see EXEC. ORDER No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-43 Compilation). The Roosevelt order, signed on June 25, 1941, required all defense contracts to contain a
covenant against discrimination. President Roosevelt and President Truman amended it several times, see EXEC. ORDER No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1054 (1938-43 Compilation); EXEc. ORDER
No. 9664, 3 C.F.R. 480 (1943-48 Compilation); EXEC. ORDER No. 10210, 3 C.F.R. 390 (194953 Compilation); EXEC. ORDER No. 10308, 3 C.F.R. 837, (1949-53 Compilation). Unlike Title
VI Executive orders, however, those orders were tied to the war powers of the President. See,
e.g., Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 1971);
EXEc. ORDER No. 10557, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-53 Compilation). Furthermore, they did not
completely ban racial discrimination in all federally funded projects.
Presidential candidate Kennedy chided his Republican opponent in 1960 because President
Eisenhower could have ended discrimination in federally assisted housing with the stroke of a
pen but had not done so. Kennedy apparently lost the ink on the way to his inauguration; he
was not to sign an order dealing with discrimination in housing, or in any other area, for two
years. Civil rights activists sent the Chief Executive pens in a sarcastic effort to speed an
executive order on housing. See A. SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS 929, 939, 948-49
(1965). Kennedy delayed two years before introducing a comprehensive civil rights bill, despite great pressure from liberals in Congress. Id. at 930-31.
Kennedy was particularly reluctant to introduce a bill with any kind of wholesale provision
outlawing discrimination in the use of federal money, especially one that employed a funds
cutoff sanction. This reluctance appeared in his response to recommendations by the Civil
Rights Commission that all federal aid to the state of Mississippi be cut off as punishment for
discriminatory practices in federally assisted programs there. Kennedy reacted unfavorably:
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accurately reflected Congressional intent, sheds no light on the issue
students makes their alma mater
of whether federal aid furnished 3to
0
a recipient of federal assistance.
The legislative record indicates that "recipient" should be read
narrowly rather than broadly. The language of the original civil
rights bill was quite expansive, conditioning "direct or indirect
financial assistance" on nondiscriminatory behavior. 3 ' The wording
was not a draftsman's blunder. In testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee, HEW Secretary Celebrezze stood behind the
inclusion of "indirect. ' 32 After Secretary Celebrezze testified, the
"I don't have the power to cut off the aid in a general way as was proposed by the Civil Rights
Commission, and I think it would be unwise to give the President of the United States that
Remarks and Question andAnswerPeriodBefore the American Society of
kind of power.
Newspaper Editors, 1963 KENNEDY PUB. PAPERS 323, 333 (1964). However, as pressure for

civil rights legislation grew in the spring and summer of 1963, Kennedy finally responded with
a civil rights bill that prohibited discrimination in the use of the funds and included a funds
cutoff provision. The provision, though written in broad terms, was not mandatory; it provided only for optional cuttoffs at the discretion of the agency head involved: "All contracts
made in connection with any such programs shall contain such provisions as the President may
prescribe for the purpose of assuring that there shall be no discrimination ... " H.R. 7152,
88th Cong., IstSess. (1963), reproducedin Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals
Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdictionof the UnitedStates Before Subcomm. No. 5 ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 659 (1963) [hereinafter

cited as Subcommittee No. 5 Hearings] (emphasis added). In his message accompanying the
proposed bill to Congress, Kennedy emphasized his reservations about applying the provision
too broadly:
[The cutoff provision] would not permit the Federal Government to cut off all Federal aid
of all kinds as a means of punishing an area for the discrimination occurring therein-but
it would clarify the authority of any administrator with respect to Federal funds or
financial assistance and discriminatory practice.
Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, 1963 KENNEDY PUB.

PAPERS 483, 492-93 (1964) (emphasis added).
Thus, in President Kennedy's mind, the proposed title VI was in no way a license for
wholesale cutoffs of funds. Rather, it was drawn flexibly to allow federal agencies to apply the
statute in a manner causing the least harm to the beneficiaries of federal aid.
30. Celler, the House sponsor of Kennedy's bill, made the following statement before the
House Rules Committee:
If the Government, through such an arrangement [financial assistance], can be said to
have "elected to place its power, prestige, and property behind the admitted discrimination," the courts may deem it a 'joint participant" and hold the segregation or discrimination unlawful .... In such circumstances, the Government may be under a duty to take
affirmative action to preclude segregation or discrimination by private entities in whose
activities it is a participant.
Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 604 (D.S.C. 1974). The citation given by the
Court for Celler's statement, 396 F. Supp. at 604 n.36, is incorrect; the correct citation is 110
CONG. REC. 1527 (1964). The statement does not address the issue of whether aid funnelled
through a student constitutes sufficient federal assistance to make a university a "recipient" (or
in Celler's words, a 'Joint participant").
31. See Subcommittee No. 5 Hearings,supra note 29, at 659.

32. Mr. Rodino. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get this because it's rather important.
Under title 6, would it not actually mean that you would have the power to withhold
funds in most any program that you administer where there is direct or indirect financial
assistance by way of grant contract, loan... ?
Secretary Celebrezze. Under existing law we probably do not have the power. . ..
Title 6 says, in the first sentence it says, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law you
will have this right." That is the difference.
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Subcommittee deleted "indirect" from the proposed draft it submitted to the Judiciary Committee. 33 The deletion may have reflected a
desire to restrict the reach of title VI and to avoid the result reached
in Bob Jones.
Although legislative history suggests Congress disfavored applying title VI to indirect funding, it also shows that Congress contemplated more than a simple direct/indirect test for indentifying title
VI and title IX recipients. The executive and the legislative branches
envisioned a distinction between "ultimate beneficiaries" and "recipients" of federal assistance. Congress drafted both statutes to protect
ultimate beneficiaries from misconduct by recipients, and intended
their sanctions to apply only to recipients - not to beneficiaries.
"Ultimate beneficiaries" of federal funds are those intended to reap
the benefits of the aid. Students are the ultimate beneficiaries of
most federal programs aiding education. "Recipients" should be defined as those institutions that receive federal funds and have discretionary power to disburse or spend them to aid these ultimate
beneficiaries.
Substantial evidence supports the contention that the government
cannot coerce a university to comply with title VI and title IX by
penalizing individual students. During the congressional debate on
title VI, Attorney General Robert Kennedy wrote to Senator Cooper
of Kentucky that "title VI is limited in application to instances of
discrimination against the beneficiaries of federal assistance programs, as the language of section 601 clearly indicates. '34 A 1964
Justice Department memorandum indicates a similar intent - 35 title
VI was meant to prevent discrimination against beneficiaries, not
to restrict use of federal aid by beneficiaries. Indeed, neither title VI
nor title IX was to be used to punish ultimate beneficiaries whose
that other intended beneficiaries
conduct does not affect the benefits
36
can derive from the program.
Subcommittee No. 5 Hearings,supra note 29, at 1542.
33. The subcommittee divided the bill into an introduction and an effectuating clause. The
introductory language, which in the original bill had contained the words "or indirect," was
revised:
Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of any law, no person in the United States
shall on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal assistance.
Cefore
the House Comm.
Ciil Rights: Hearingson H.R. 7152 as amendedby Subcomm. No. 5
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., IstSess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as House JudiciaryHearings].
None of the testimony in subsequent Judiciary Committee hearings mentions this change, or
explains its significance. Although the record is not explicit, it seems fairly clear that Congress
was worried about the scope given title VI by the word "indirect," and for that reason excised

it from the bill.
34. 110 CONG. REc. 10076 (1964) (emphasis added).
35. See Kuhn, supra note 25, at 52.
36. See Letter from Attorney General Robert Kennedy to Senator John Sherman Cooper

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 78:608

HEW and Veterans Administration regulations issued under title

VI also draw a line between recipients and ultimate beneficiaries. In
almost identical language, they state:
The term "recipient" means any State, political subdivision ... or instrumentality of any State of political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any
individual, in any State, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended, directly or through another recipient, for any program. . . but
37
such term does not include any ultimate benefciaryunder anyprogram.

Thus, the legislative history and the regulations under title VI agree
that (1) the statute's purpose is to protect only those persons whom
the federal funds are designed to help, (2) the statute's sanctions apply only to recipients, not to beneficiaries. 38
Congress probably viewed a recipient as someone who, like a
beneficiary, receives federal money, but who, unlike a beneficiary,
has the power and duty to choose which beneficiaries receive federal

aid. Applying this definition, a recipient who discriminates harms
the intended beneficiaries of federal aid. A beneficiary who discriminates cannot prevent another intended beneficiary from receiving
federal aid. If Bob Jones University seeks a federal grant to finance

chemistry instruction, title VI bars the grant because the school's discriminatory policies prevent the aid from reaching some of the intended beneficiaries - in this case, black chemistry students. On the
other hand, if the governfhent selects a particular student for assis(April 29, 1964), reprintedin BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964, at 359 (1964). Kennedy discussed the application of title VI to farmers receiving federal
price supports: "[Title VII would not authorize imposition of any requirements with respect to
farm employment, since/am employees are not ben§eiariesoftheprogramsreferredto." Id. at
360 (1964) (emphasis added). Representative Celer, the House sponsor of H.R. 7152, agreed
with Kennedy, pointing out that title VI prohibits only discrimination under programs aided
by federal money. See Civil Rzghts: Hearingson H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules,
88th Cong. 2d Sess. 94-95 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Rules Hearings]. Farm employees are

not under any "program" of commodity price supports since the program seeks to help the
farmer and not his employees. Hence, they are not beneficiaries and not protected by title VI
from discrimination by farm owners. Section 604 of title VI (added after the Kennedy letter
and the Celler testimony), further shows that title VI is aimed only at protecting the intended
beneficiaries of federal aid. Section 604 states that the title does not apply "to any employment
practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3
(1976). Only where the primary objective is to provide employment does the employee become an intended beneficiary of the act and receive its protection. See also Kuhn, supra note
25, at 50-62 (arguing that title IX cahnot be used to regulate the employment policies of educational institutions).
37. 45 C.F.R. § 80.13(i) (1977) (emphasis added). 4ccord,38 C.F.R. § 18.13(h) (1977). But
see 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1979) (defining "recipient" for title IX purposes). The title IX definition duplicates title VI regulations, .except that the phrase excluding ultimate beneficiaries is
dropped.
38. See also Seattle Univ. v. HEW, No. C77-631S (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 1978), appealdocketed, No. 78-1746 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 1978); Romeo County Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021
(E.D. Mich. 1977), affrmed, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979) (title IX regulations cannot restrict
employment practices of educational institutions since employees are generally not the beneficiaries of programs aiding education).
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tance (say, because he is a veteran or because he qualifies for social
security benefits), that student should receive the money regardless
of which college he decides to attend; his decision to attend a university that violates title VI or title IX does not deny aid to other beneficiaries,3 9 and to deny him that choice is to punish a beneficiary of
federal aid.
Consequently, when an institution is given the power to select
specific beneficiaries of federal aid, it must distribute that aid within
the restraints Congress has imposed: it must not discriminate on the
basis of sex or race. But when the federal government designates
specific beneficiaries, such as the veterans in Bob Jones, or the grantrecipients in Grove City, it has assumed the power of selecting beneficiaries and removed the college's discretion to do so. Whether the
check is sent directly to the student or to the university for credit to
the school is not a "recipient" for title VI and
the student's account,
40
title IX purposes.
Bob Jones and Grove City express concerns that any definition of
recipient should reflect. The Bob Jones court correctly pointed out
that the form of payment of federal aid should not govern whether
title VI applies; the Grove City court was properly concerned that a
cutoff would injure the intended beneficiaries of federal aid. But the
courts failed to define recipient in a manner that would allay both
concerns while comporting with congressional intent. The best definition is that recipients are those with discretion to choose among
potential beneficiaries; Grove City, Bob Jones, and other similarly
situated universities cannot be recipients if they lack that discretion.
II.

WHAT IS A "PROGRAM OR PART THEREOF"?

Recipients of federal assistance, however that class is defined,
face a further troublesome uncertainty. The ultimate sanction for
violation of title VI or title IX is termination of federal funding. But
both statutes limit any cutoff to the "particular program, or part
thereof," in which noncompliance is found.41 This "pinpoint provision" has been applied to universities in markedly different ways.
HEW presumes that all federal aid to a university may be termi39. How the beneficiary spends the money is irrelevant since his spending habits will not
affect other beneficiaries. His decision to spend it at a university having discriminatory policies should make no difference - the schools where the money is spent are not intended
beneficiaries of the aid. His choice of school is analogous to a farmer's decision to use price
support money to hire only white workers, and title VI does not prohibit the farmer's discrimination; see note 36 supra. Moreover, the school is not the recipient since it has no power to
disburse federal aid. The federal government performed that function when it extended the
aid directly to the beneficiary.
40. Even if a student selects a particular school because of its discriminatory policies, no
direct aid to the student should be cut off since beneficiaries are not subject to the sanctions of
title VI and title IX. See text at notes 34-36-supra.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976) (title VI); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) (title IX).
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nated if any part discriminates; 4 2 one court has suggested that discrimination in law school admissions warrants termination of aid
only to that admissions program and not to the rest of the law school
or university.4 3 This Section examines the legislative history of the
pinpoint provisions and describes how courts and agencies have applied the provisions to universities.

A.

The Legislative History of the PinpointProvisions

Although title IX applies exclusively to education programs, its
pinpoint provision was copied from title VI with little comment;
hence title IX legislative history sheds little light on how the pinpoint
provision applies to private universities. 44 The title VI legislative
history also is ambiguous on this issue. The pinpoint provision was
added to title VI relatively late in the legislative process, 45 and Senators and Representatives only vaguely explained its meaning.4 6 Distitle VI on education centered on elementary
cussion of the effect of 47
and secondary schools.
The original House version of title VI did not include a pinpoint
provision; it stated only that any "agency. . .empowered to extend
• . .assistance to any program" would have full power to cut off
funds "under such program. '4 8 Although most agreed that the "program" limitation was designed to penalize only the specific parties
or activities guilty of discrimination, 49 even the bill's sponsors ad42. See text at notes 64-67 infra.
43. See Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and text
at notes 61-63 supra.
44. See Kuhn, supra note 25, at 50, 64-65.
45. The pinpoint provisions were included in amendments proposed by Senators Mansfield and Dirksen after the Civil Rights Bill, H.R. 7152, had already passed the House of
Representatives and after several months of debate in the Senate. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRs, THE CIVIL RIOHTS Acr OF 1964, at 289 (1964).
46. See Comment, BoardofPublic Instruction v. Finch: UnwarrantedCompromise of Title
Vi's Termination Sanction, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1113, 1121 (1970).
47. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 7101-04, 14433-41 (1964) (discussion of effect of segregation
on school lunch programs in primary and secondary schools).
48. See H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., IstSess. (1963), reprintedat H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 25 (1963).
49. Secretary Celebrezze of HEW confirmed this interpretation during questioning before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Judiciary Committee:
Mr. Meader.... Would you ... because the participants or beneficiary is discriminated
against on the ground of race with respect to voting, be able to withhold library funds?
Secretary Celebrezze. Not under my interpretation. It would be specifically aimed at one
program.
[U]nder existing law, we do have a hardship in some cases where, if it applies to one
part of a state it applies in the total state program. Title VI would avoid that part at least.
110 CONG. REc. 7483 (1964).
Attorney General Kennedy took the same position in hearings before the full House Judiciary Committee:
Mr. Willis.... If there is discrimination in one program, does it go to that one or the
others? Does the bill say that?
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mitted that its language might be too broad to ensure that only the
offending parties' funds would be cut off. 50 Many Representatives
beneficiaries in response to
feared broad cutoffs of aid to numerous
5
discrimination involving but a few. '
When the bill reached the Senate, the relatively unqualified termination provision 52 disturbed many Senators.5 3 Fearing that the
entire bill might fail to pass, Senators Mansfield and Dirksen introduced an amendment limiting any cutoff to the "political entity or
part thereof' and to the "program or part thereof' 54 found to be in
violation of title VI. Although these pinpoint provisions were
adopted and incorporated into what is now section 602 of title VI,
there was little discussion of the meaning of "program or part
thereof. '5 5 In explaining the Senate amendments to the House of
Representatives, Judiciary Committee Chairman Celler stated that
all federal "aid to a particular program will not be cut off because
Attorney General Kennedy.... That is specifically what we want to meet, just the one
program. It is aimed at the particular situation, not aimed across the board.
House JudiciaryHearings, supra note 33, at 2685.
50. Representative McCullough, one of the bill's sponsors, was forced to admit that the
bill's language might be too general to guarantee pinpointing of cutoffs. See Rules Hearings,
supra note 36, at 247-48. Emanuel Celler, the House proponent of H.R. 7152, commented in
hearings to HEW Secretary Celebrezze that "great powers are given to you [by title VI]...
there should be some standards to govern your action." Subcommittee No. 5 Hearings,supra
note 29, at 1520-21.
51. See, e.g., Rules Hearings, supra note 36, at 247-48 (statement of Congressman Smith).
52. Although the Senators agreed that activities so obviously different as highway projects
and school projects would not be considered one "program," they were unsure about borderline cases, such as school lunch programs and general school expenditures. When Senator
Long asked Senator Javits whether federal lunch aid would be continued if sent to both black
and white students, though in segregated schools, Javits replied: "I do not feel we should
continue that kind of aid ...." 111 CONG. REc. 7101 (1964). No Senator disputed Senator
Javit's analysis, not even Senator Ribicoff, one of those who had been designated to explain
title VI. Ribicoff commented only that the agency head involved might find ways to enforce
desegregation other than by cutting off lunch money:
Is it not true that the administrator's responsibility, if he felt that the cutoff of the lunch
program might be detrimental to the health of Negro youngsters, would have the alternative of requesting the Attorney General to bring a lawsuit. ..?
I[Ulnder Title VI the cutting off of funds is the last resort."
Ill CONG. REC. 7107 (1964).
53. One such Senator was George Aiken of Vermont:
The House report would limit punishment only to that area which is in violation. Others,
however, interpret the language of the bill as authorizing the application of penalties to
the whole state.
I believe that Title VI should be greatly improved and made more specific .... President
Johnson must know that continued insistence on the Senate passing the bill identically as
it came from the House will likely result in killing the legislation.
110 CONG. REC. 9123-24 (1964). Senators Stennis, Sparkman, Humphrey, and Pastore also
engaged in a lively exchange on the scope of title VI cutoffs. See 110 CONG. REC. 8641-43
8980 (1964).
54. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 289 (1964).
The amendment is reprinted at 110 CONG. REC. 11930 (1964).
55. See Comment, supra note 46, at 1121.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 78:608

one particular part of the program or institution is being operated in
violation of the law."' 56 Celler's words suggest that discrimination by
onlypart of a university should not trigger cutoffs to the rest of the
university. At the very least, Celler's statement evinces a concern
that too many beneficiaries may lose federal funding if cutoffs are
not pinpointed.
Although the legislative history of the pinpoint provisions is meager, two conclusions can safely be drawn from it. First, Congress
wanted to protect beneficiaries from discrimination by the recipients
of federal funds. 57 Members of Congress repeatedly insisted that the
purpose of any aid cutoff was to "see to it that federal funds were not
used in a discriminatory manner.158 Second, Congress desired to
protect beneficiaries from an unnecessary funds cutoff due to discrimination in a distinct program or area.59 The delicate tradeoff
between the two types of protection goes to the heart of both the
ambiguity of the pinpoint provision's legislative history and the dilemma of how to apply the pinpoint provision to a university.
B. Appying the PinpointProvision to Private Universities
The scant legislative history of the pinpoint provisions indicates
that Congress had the somewhat inconsistent goals of protecting students from discrimination and protecting them from aid cutoffs.
Given such a vague mandate, courts and agencies have applied the
provisions to universities in a variety of ways. This Section reviews
several applications and advocates that courts and agencies avoid extreme construction of the words "program or part thereof' in the
context of a university.
In Stewart v. New York University,60 Judge Bonsal of the Southern Distict of New York defined "program or part thereof' as if a
university were a collection of many atomistic parts. A woman denied admission to New York University's law school alleged that the
school violated titles VI and IX by admitting less qualified minority
students. Her suit to terminate federal loans and grants to the law
school and the university was dismissed. Although the court dis56. Rules Hearings,supra note 36, at 6 (emphasis added). Celler was speaking before the

House Rules Committee as a representative of both the House and the Senate proponents of
title VI - he was the House sponsor of title VI as well as the Congressman selected by the
Senate to explain Senate amendments to the House.
57. See notes 34-40 supra and accompanying text.
58. 110 CONG. REC. 5253 (1964) (statement of Senator Humphrey). See also 110 CONO.
REc. 6062 (1964) (statement of Senator Pastore that "the purpose of title VI is to make sure
funds of the United States are not used to support racial discrimination."); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); Comment, supra note 46, at 1113; Note, Adhninlstra.
live CutoffofFederalFundingUnder Title VI" 4 ProposedInterpretationof "Program,"52 IND.
L.J. 651, 651 (1977).
59. See notes 48-56 supra and accompanying text.
60. 430 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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cussed the validity of the admissions policy in the context of other

counts of the complaint, it held that policy to be "irrelevant" to the
Court's jurisdiction under title VI and title IX. Termination of
assistance under the statutes is limited to the noncomplying "program or part thereof," reasoned Judge Bonsal, and the assistance at

issue (restricted purpose grants and loans for law school dormitory
construction) was not awarded in connection with the minority admissions policy.61 The opinion implies that admissions is "part of a
program," and that federal retaliation for discriminatory admissions
62

policies cannot embrace cutoffs of any aid except to admissions.

Although this analysis of Stewart reads much between the lines

of a decision presenting peculiar circumstances, 63 the implications of

an atomistic interpretation of the pinpoint provisions should not be
ignored. If university aid cutoffs are restricted to the smallest identi-

fiable unit responsible for discrimination, ignoring effects of the discrimination outside that unit, title VI and title IX sanctions are
excessively weakened. However distinct the admissions department's budget or organization may be, discriminatory admissions

will cause all federal aid to a university to be spent in a discriminatory manner. A black student denied access to all programs of a
university would find title VI protection chimerical if the admissions
office alone were denied federal funds.
If Stewart protects students from aid cutoffs at the cost of leaving
them defenseless against discrimination, HEW enforcement of title
VI and title IX approaches the opposite extreme. HEW often
presumes that aid to an entire university may be terminated if any
division discriminates. Secretary Weinberger's explanation of
HEW's authority under title IX exposes this presumption: "if the

Federal funds go to an institution which has educational programs,
61. 430 F. Supp. at 1314.
62. The opinion does not clearly state the reason the plaintiffs claims under title IX and
title VI were dismissed. After quoting the pinpoint provision of title VI, the court inserted a
paragraph emphasizing that the plaintiff "must show that the Federal financial assistance received by the Law School constitutes more than a de minimus portion of its annual revenues
and that there is some material connection between said assistance and the minority admissions policy .... 430 F. Supp. at 1314. The court then argued that, since grants to the law
school, loans for construction of a law dormitory, and loans to law students were not connected to the admissions policy, they did not give the court jurisdiction under title VI or title
IX. Since the court presumably would have assumed jurisdiction had that aid been awarded
through the admissions office, it seems likely that the court considered admissions a separate
part of a program for title VI and title IX purposes.
63. Stewart raised two complex issues which were unsettled at the time of the suit. First,
the status of private suits for violation of title VI and title IX remained uncertain until Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), authorized such suits. Second, the scope of title
VI rights of persons injured by minority admissions programs remained uncertain at least until
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Stewart court apparently used the pinpoint provisions of title VI and title IX as escape clauses to avoid these
troublesome issues.
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then the institution is covered throughout its activities."'64 HEW regulations implementing title VI also imply that cutoffs will be university wide. 65 HEW's approach effectively deletes the "program or
part thereof' limitations from title VI and title IX.
The implications of HEW's expansive interpretation of the

pinpoint provisions are as disturbing as the atomistic approach of
Stewart. As the President of Columbia University observed:
[T]he regulations provide no flexibility for dealing with minor inadequacies or limited noncompliance. One entrenched and misguided
department chairman can bring an entire university under federal
threat. It would be more reasonable and perhaps also more just if federal66regulators could direct their pressures pointedly at the malingerers.
The most extreme possible applications of the HEW presumption
have not yet been attempted; no large university has lost all grants

and scholarships because a few students in an isolated program suf-

fered discrimination. 67 The prospect of such a cutoff nevertheless

remains troublesome; thousands of student beneficiaries would suffer
in order to protect a few from discrimination.
64. Sex DiscriminationRegulations: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education ofthe House Comm. on EducationandLabor,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 485 (1975) (statement
of HEW Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger). See Kuhn, supra note 25, at 64.
65. One regulation that establishes when forms assuring compliance with title VI must be
submitted states:
The assurance required with respect to an institution of higher education . . . shall be
applicable to the entire institution unless the applicant establishes, to the satisfaction of
the responsible Department official, that the institution's practices in designated parts or
programs of the institution will in no way affect its practices in the programs of the institution for which Federal financial assistance is sought, or the beneficiaries of or participants
in such program.
45 C.F.R. 80.4(d)(2) (1979). Although requiring a compliance form is different from requring
termination of assistance, see United States v. El Camino Community College Dist., 454 F.
Supp. 825, 831 (C.D. Cal. 1978), the regulation creates a presumption that cutoffs will be university wide unless an individual department establishes that it is unaffected by discrimination
elsewhere in the university. Although the regulation clearly permits pinpointing title VI cutoffs, it increases the likelihood of blanket cutoffs by shifting to individual departments the
burden of proving the absence of discrimination. See also H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN,
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 545 (1979) ("It is clear that to date, HEW is unwilling to
go along with the "program specific" limitation in enforcement of Title IX").
66. McGill, supra note 2, at 152.
67. This may not yet have occurred because of the effect such a threat has upon a univcrsity. Fearing loss of all federal aid due to a policy in one tiny program, a large university may
avert the risk by changing the policy. That would, of course, achieve one of the goals of title
VI and title IX - it would prevent discrimination. But it would do so by imposing a sanction
beyond that intended by Congress. And such a broad sanction would have profound impact
on the operation of private universities. Forcing a central administration to dictate specific
policies to formerly independent departments would alter the pluralism and diversity to which
many have ascribed the greatness of American universities. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (importance of a diverse student body); M.
Moos & F. ROURKE, THE CAMPUS AND THE STATE 309-10 (1959) (the central administrator of
a university "occupies a position of supreme legal responsibility in higher education, but if he
exercises this authority in a pervasive way in the internal affairs of the university, he risks
destroying the vitality and the creative energy by which the institution is nourished").
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Stewart and HEW mark opposite extremes in interpreting the
pinpoint provisions of title VI and title IX. Although the appropriate balance between protecting students from aid cutoffs and protecting them from discrimination probably lies somewhere between
these extremes, developing a formula that determines the proper balance is extraordinarily difficult. If a university were a hierarchy,

with programs, departments, and schools ranked in an ascending series, and with little interchange among units at any level, the perimeter of a federal aid cutoff could be easily drawn. If one discovered
discrimination in a program of a university, aid cutoffs could be con-

fined to that program, or expanded to embrace the entire department
under which it operates, or further expanded to cover an entire

school within a university. But universities often differ from this hierarchical model in two important ways. First, the faculty of each
department or school may be primarily responsible for supervising
its own conduct, with relatively little control by a central administration.68 Second, although each department or school acts indepenoften share ideas, students, faculty, and a broad
dently, departments
69
range of services.
This model of a university with independent yet interdependent
departments and schools makes drawing the perimeter of a funds

cutoff difficult. A discriminatory policy independently created by
one department may have effects far beyond that department

through the students, faculty, and services shared with other parts of
the university.70 Cutting off the aid of the discriminating department

alone may narrow the sanction disproportionately; cutting off aid to
all departments affected by the discrimination may punish many stu-

dents in departments innocent of discrimination. The balance between protection from discrimination and protection from cutoffs is
precarious indeed.

Yet courts have not left us totally without guidance in applying
the pinpoint provisions to balance these goals. In Board of Public
Instruction v. Finch,7 1 the Fifth Circuit held that all funding to sev-

68. See McGill, supra note 2, at 151: "Any university, as we all know, operates best as a
loosely coupled collegial organization in which each academic unit is primarily responsible for
supervising its own conduct." Of course, some universities may bear no resemblance to a
loosely coupled collegial organization. If a university is tightly controlled by a central administration, with little independent policy-making by each department and school, the case for a
blanket aid cutoff in the face of discrimination becomes more persuasive.
69. Undergraduate students usually "major" in one department but take numerous courses
in other departments as well. Even at the graduate level, multidisciplinary programs and
teaching appointments are becoming the order of the day. All departments and professional
schools often share recreational facilities, student housing, maintenance services, and even admissions and placement services.
70. Discrimination in a history department, for example, may affect students from other
schools or majors enrolled in history courses and faculty from other departments who use the
resources of the history department for their research and teaching.
71. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
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eral programs of a local public school district could not be cut off
without a showing of discrimination under each program. The court
overturned HEW's blanket cutoff of aid to the school district because
it interpreted the pinpoint provision of title VI to protect programs
that were "insulated" from discriminatory practices. Nevertheless,
the court noted that programs may be so interrelated that a program
guilty of no overt discrimination may be "infected by a discrimina72
tory environment" and subject to termination of federal aid.
Though this "infection theory" 73 has its critics, 74 it offers a helpful standard in applying the pinpoint provision to universities. If
discriminatory practices in one division, such as admissions, infect
the entire university with a discriminatory environment, then all federal aid should be terminated. 75 But the harder case, where discrimination in one division of a university has varying effects on other
divisions, requires a much more careful examination of those effects.
Rather than assume that all aid will be terminated or that only aid to
the smallest identifiable discriminating unit must be cut, courts and
agencies should balance the degree of discriminatory infection in
each department or school against the extent of hardship that cutoffs
would inflict on the division's student beneficiaries. The most attractive attribute of this balancing approach is that it would define "program or part thereof' in each case according to the best interests of
76
the beneficiaries of federal aid - the students.
Whatever standard is used to draw the perimeters of a federal aid
cutoff when a university violates title VI or title IX, rote application
of the extreme Stewart or HEW approaches should be avoided.
Both title VI and title IX seek to protect students from discrimina72. 414 F.2d at 1078-79.
73. This is the label commonly applied to the Board ofPub. Instruction v. Finch approach

to pinpointing cutoffs. See Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 430 (1979).
74. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 46.

75. Hence federal aid to a university with practices like those of Bob Jones University
would be terminated, assuming the university is a "recipient." See notes 2-40 supra and ac-

companying text. See also Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in which a
system-wide racial imbalance in admissions to a network of state universities led to imposition
of title VI sanctions on the entire university system.

76. At least one court has applied an analysis similar to that proposed here. In Seattle
Univ. v. HEW, No. C77-6315 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 1978), appeal doecketed, No. 78-1746 (9th
Cir. April 6, 1978), the court looked to the beneficiaries of education programs to decide
whether federal aid to a university could be terminated because of discrimination in employment alleged to violate title IX. After ruling that termination was improper since the sanction
would not be imposed "for the purpose of enforcing [the students'] rights," the court added,
[o]n the other hand, in a situation where students or other direct beneficiaries of federally
funded programs are themselves the victims of discrimination in thatprogram,the cutoff
has obvious justification and enforcement value.
(Emphasis added.)

For a different view on how the words "program or part thereof' in title VI should be
interpreted, see Note, Administrative Cutoff of FederalFunding Under Title VI. A Proposed
Interpretationof "Program,"52 IND. L.J. 651 (1977).
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tion and, through their pinpoint provisions, from unlimited cutoffs of
federal assistance. Any definition of "program or part thereof'
should reflect congressional concern for both hazards. To neglect
one in pursuit of the other - to narrow cutoffs while ignoring the
need for deterrence of discrimination, or to broaden cutoffs until
many students in innocent departments or schools suffer for one
school's discrimination against a few students - harms the very beneficiaries Congress sought to protect.
CONCLUSION

Concern for the student beneficiaries of federal aid should guide
any court that applies title VI and title IX to private universities.
Since both statutes seek to protect beneficiaries from discrimination
by recipients, a "recipient" should be defined as an institution with
the power to discriminate - to choose which of many potential beneficiaries will receive federal assistance. If a university lacks that
power because the government selects the beneficiary, then it is not a
recipient and the sanctions of title VI and title IX should not apply.
As well as seeking to protect students from discrimination, both
statutes also seek to protect students from overbroad cutoffs of federal assistance; they limit cutoffs to the program or part thereof that
violates the law. A proper definition of "program or part thereof'
will balance these twin dangers to beneficiaries. It will avoid any
extreme presumptions that offer students complete protection from
one risk but leave them defenseless against the other. By defining
"recipient" and "program or part thereof' in these ways, courts and
agencies will fulfill the purposes of title VI and title IX while preserving the independence of the private university.

